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Abstract 
This paper considers whether a BRICS bank is part of an evolution of China’s power play as 
the geopolitical landscape moves from the bipolar world to a multipolar world. The paper 
looks as factors such as (i) the constitution of the BRICS Bank, (ii) its potential challenges, 
(iii) the multilateral power plays between US and China, (iv) whether China will be viewed 
as a threat, (v) a BRICS Bank versus the AIIB, (vi) China’s role in such an institution, (vii) 
the fight for influence in the African continent, and (viii) possible paths such an institution 
will take. The paper believes that a BRICS Bank is one step along the way for China to estab-
lish the norm of itself being regarded as a global power in a multipolar world. 
 
 
Background 
 
The IMF is dominated by members of the European Union (EU), and the World Bank by the 
United States (U.S.). The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is predominantly funded by Ja-
pan. In a multipolar world with emerging new powers like China and India, the BRICS Bank 
could become the multilateral organization where countries can exert their influence and 
drive the agenda through projects the institution chooses to undertake in developing coun-
tries. Although there has been much speculation on the potential of such an institution, few 
has written in detail on the implications of a BRICS Bank in a multipolar world. Our cap-
stone thesis attempts to review existing literature and contribute to the discussion based on 
the evidence collected. 
 
The idea of a BRICS Bank has been widely reported in the media and is a result of the redis-
tribution of global economic power from the bipolar world, post-WWII and Bretton Woods, 
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to the multipolar world of the present time. However if such an entity were to come into ex-
istence, what will it look like? What are the implications in a multipolar world and how will 
it function and interact with incumbent institutions? Is this a façade in a power struggle be-
tween old and new economic and political tsars? This paper strives to answer these questions 
in a systematic and empirical manner to contribute to the discussion that so far, has not di-
rectly addressed these issues in a holistic manner. 
 
 
Declining Influence of Advanced Economies 
 
G7 Economies versus Emerging Market Economies 
 
In this section we look at the differences between developed and emerging market econo-
mies. We proxy developed economies with the G7 countries consisting of Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom (“UK”) and United States of America (“USA”). At 
the time of the G7’s founding, the combined GDP of the member countries represented about 
half of the world’s GDP1. Emerging Market Economies are broken into two categories, 
BRICS consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and MINT consisting of 
Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey. The term BRICS was coined by Jim O’Neil, then 
Chief Economist of Goldman Sachs who predicted these countries would overtake the six 
largest western economies by 2041, which was later revised to 20322. In 2013 Jim O’Neil 
                                               
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/what-is-the-g7 
2 Tett (2010) 
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identified another group of economies which he coined MINT that had similar demographic 
and economic prospects as BRICS3. 
 
This section compares the economic performance and demography between G7, MINT and 
BRICS groupings, and individual countries that form the BRICS group. General findings in-
cludes (i) there is only a subtle difference in economic performance between BRICS and 
MINT group of countries, (ii) MINT group of countries are able to economically achieve 
such economic performance with a far small population, (iii) G7 group of countries still have 
a great led in high value industrial production proxies by Services Value-Added, and (iv) the 
proportion of urban population in MINT economies are higher than BRICS economies. How-
ever the political maturity and situation of these countries need to be considered in order to 
justify whether the rewards are commensurate to the risks in investing into these countries. 
 
Economy 
 
GDP 
 
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
                                               
3 Lexicon (2015) 
  4"
 
Source: World Bank 
The G7 economies grew at a slower pace compared to BRICS and MINT economies, alt-
hough the volatility of the growth is much smaller. The trend growth rate for G7 economies 
during 1990-2013 is approximately 2%. The BRICS economies have been growing at a more 
rapid rate with real economic growth increasing at a pace of 1% per year. Unlike MINT 
economies, BRICS economic growth slowed during the global financial crisis in 2009 
(“GFC”) rather than falling into a recession, however BRICS economic growth have not re-
covered to its original trajectory post-GFC. MINT economies exhibit the most volatile eco-
nomic growth profile during 1990-2013 with economic growth rates ranging from approxi-
mately 7% to -2% during the period. MINT and G7 economies fell into recession during the 
GFC albeit the magnitude for MINT economies was not as extreme, and both G7 and MINT 
economies rebounded to trend growth trajectories post-GFC. 
 
 
GDP Per Capita 
 
Figure 2: Real GDP per capita Growth (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
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Source: World Bank 
 
The trend growth rate of G7 GDP per capita averaged 1.2% p.a. during 1990-2013 which was 
not a significantly lower growth rate when compared to BRICS GDP per capita average 
growth rate of 1.7% p.a. during the period and the volatility associated with the growth was 
much lower. MINT economies grew at a faster average growth rate of 2.1% p.a. during the 
period although the volatility of the growth was more significant. All economic grouping fell 
into a recession during the GFC when using GDP per capita as a standard for measuring eco-
nomic growth but BRICS economies were more resilient than G7 and MINT economies. 
 
Economic Mix 
 
Agriculture 
 
Figure 3: Agriculture Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
  6"
 
Source: World Bank 
 
The agriculture value-added is the lowest for G7 economies and highest for MINT econo-
mies. This is not unexpected as developed economies have greater production focus in higher 
value-added products compared to developing economies. However the interesting observa-
tions from Figure 3 are (i) there remains a significant average 14 percentage point gap be-
tween G7 economies and BRICS and MINT economies in terms of shifting to higher value-
added production because during 1990-2013 (“the period”), (ii) BRICS economies have 
made a greater transition away from agricultural production than MINT economies, and (iii) 
there is an economic shift towards for higher value-added economic activity after the GFC 
with MINT economies has narrowing its agriculture value-added gap with BRICS econo-
mies. 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Figure 4: Manufacturing Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
The trend of manufacturing activity had been at a declining trend in the G7 economies since 
1990 until the GFC where there has been a pickup of manufacturing activity at the expense of 
BRICS economies. After 2009, there was a been a steady decline in the US Dollar (“USD”) 
with the trade weighted U.S. Dollar Index declining from 114.3 in March 2009 to a low of 
94.2 in August 2011 and ended 2013 at the 102 index level4.  The Euro (“EUR”) has similar-
ly declined with the trade weighted EUR index falling from a peak of 114. 4 in December 
2008 to a low of 94.6 in July 2012 and ended 2013 at the 104.1 level5. The MINT economies 
manufacturing value-added have remained stable post-GFC suggesting there might be reallo-
cation of manufacturing activity from BRICS to MINT countries. 
 
Services 
 
Figure 5: Services Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
                                               
4 https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TWEXB 
5 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/effective/html/index.en.html 
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Source: World Bank 
 
During 1990-2013 the G7 economies have continued to add on its capabilities in the services 
sector with services value-added growing from under 65% of GDP to over 75% of GDP. 
Since the ascension of China into the WTO in 2000, China has been dubbed as the world’s 
manufacturer with its abundance of factories, supply chain network, scale of production and 
cheap labor in its coastal cities6. However services value-added in MINT economies have 
progressed ahead of BRICS economies during the period albeit BRICS have caught up to 
narrow that gap. 
 
Terms of Trade 
 
Figure 6: Terms of Trade 
 
                                               
6 Noble (2012), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/01/25/reshoring-five-reasons-why-china-will-remain-the-
worlds-factory/ 
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Source: World Bank 
 
G7 economies have less favorable terms of trade statistics compared to MINT and BRICS 
economies because being services based economies, it imports more than it exports. One such 
example is the consistent trade deficit between the USA and China. This is predominantly 
due to the measurement of terms of trade because measures the relationship between the val-
ue of exported and imported goods. However the inherent weakness of such measure is it 
does not necessarily take into account the value-added in the manufacturing process from 
various countries, rather only the country of export and the country of import. One example is 
the Apple iPhone that is designed in the USA with parts sourced globally and manufactured 
in China. Under the terms of trade measurement, USA would import the iPhone from China 
with no credit given to the services value-added in the manufacturing process. Therefore in 
BRICS and MINT countries where cheaper labor was abundant during the period, this has 
helped its terms of trade position.  
 
Population and Demography 
 
Population 
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Figure 7: Total Population, Number of People 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
The most populous country grouping is BRICS with China and India as constituent members. 
MINT has the smallest population of the grouping with Indonesia being the only populous 
constituent. One of the reasons Jim O’Neil considered BRICS as the next economic power-
house is the large population size, which would drive the market potential of these countries 
for consumption of products. As will be discussed below, the household consumption poten-
tial is yet to be realized in countries like China. 
 
Figure 8: Population Growth Rate (%) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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G7 economies have the lowest population growth rate at approximate 0.5% p.a. This com-
pares to MINT and BRICS countries that had higher population growth rates which has de-
clined steadily during the period to stabilize at 1.0% p.a. The decline in population growth 
presents a demography and economic problem for ranging from lack of supply of labor in the 
future to small number of taxpayers to fund government social safety net programs albeit this 
more of an issue for G7 countries rather than a MINT and BRICS countries. 
 
Urban and Rural Mix 
 
Figure 9: Urban and Rural Population Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
The G7 have the highest proportion of its population living in urban areas during the period. 
It is interesting to observe that BRICS population mix is converging to be equally distributed 
between rural and urban whilst MINT population mix has progress ahead of BRICS with the 
continued shift in the population moving to urban centers. These have implications for em-
ployment, i.e. whether there are enough jobs in urban areas to support such a population shift, 
and food security, i.e. with less farmers where would all the agricultural products come from? 
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Figure 10: Rural and Urban Population Growth (%) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
In G7 countries, the population growth is taking place in urban areas compared to rural areas 
where there is negative population growth. There is a similar trend for BRICS and MINT al-
beit the negative population growth is less extreme for MINT. 
 
Age 
 
Figure 11: Population Age Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
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The G7, BRICS and MINT countries exhibit similar structures of age distribution in the pop-
ulation. During the period the working age population of 15-64 years old form the largest 
segment of the population whilst 0-14 years old form a declining proportion of the population 
and, 65 years old and over is relatively stable. This age structure presents problems as dis-
cussed above in the “Population” especially when the 15-64 years old segment moves on to 
65 years old and over category. 
 
Gender Mix 
 
Figure 12: Population Gender Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
BRICS have an even distribution of male and females in their population whilst G7 countries 
have more females and MINT have more males. As will be discussed below, the gender mix 
in the population and labor force participation rates will have implications for the potential 
production capacities for these economies. 
 
Labor Force Participation 
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Figure 13: Labor Force Participation Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
BRICS have a higher labor force participation rate compared to MINT and G7 group albeit 
the difference is less significant compared to the beginning of the period. Female labor force 
participation is the highest in the G7 group and the lowest in BRICS. Male labor force partic-
ipation is the highest in BRICS and the lowest in the G7 group with the gap becoming more 
significant over time. 
 
Employment 
 
Figure 14: Employment Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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BRICS have a higher employment rate compared to MINT and G7 group albeit the difference 
is less significant compared to the beginning of the period. Female employment rate is the 
highest in the G7 group and the lowest in BRICS and MINT groups. Male labor force partici-
pation is the highest in BRICS and the lowest in the G7 group with the gap becoming more 
significant over time. 
 
 
Savings and Household Consumption 
 
Figure 15:  Savings Rate, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
BRICS countries have the highest savings rate compared to MINT and G7 groups. This has 
implication for future capital flows as the size of the savings pool will determine the capital 
available for future investments. 
 
Figure 16: Household Consumption, Percentage of GDP 
  16"
 
Source: World Bank 
 
MINT has the highest household consumption level compared to BRICS with the lowest. As 
discussed above, such a consumption gap represents the potential market of consumers as 
these countries continue to open up their markets to foreign imported goods. 
 
Political Situation 
 
Figure N: Political Assessment 
 
Source: World Governance Indicators, World Bank 
 
The political situation in G7 countries is far more stable than BRICS and MINT according to 
the World Banks World Governance Indicators, albeit the degree of freedom in G7 countries 
have decline due to (i) measures to combat terrorism, (ii) poorer economic conditions after 
the GFC, and (iii) more civil disobedience due to austerity policies and income inequality. 
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BRICS and MINT countries are gradually improving their governance measures with signifi-
cant progress made in Turkey and Brazil. 
 
BRICS Countries 
CHINA 
 
Economy 
 
GDP 
 
Figure 17: China’s Real GDP Growth 1990-2013 (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s real GDP growth was the strongest amongst its BRICS peers. The economy grew, on 
average, by 9.9%, hitting a peak of 14.2% in 1992 and low of 3.8% in 1990. China’s econo-
my benefited from its ascension to the World Trade Organization that opened up market ac-
cess for its products after 2000. However China’s economy is in transition having progress 
from government and export led growth to consumer driven growth. 
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GDP Per Capita 
 
Figure 18: China’s GDP Per Capita Growth (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s real GDP per capita growth was the strongest amongst its BRICS peers. GDP per 
capita grew, on average, by 9.0%, hitting a peak of 13.6% in 2007 and low of 2.3% in 1990. 
 
 
Economic Mix 
 
Agriculture 
 
Figure 19: China’s Agriculture Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
China’s Agriculture Value-Added was below average amongst its BRICS peers. Agriculture 
Value-Added averaged 15.4% of GDP, hitting a peak of 27.1% in 1990 and low of 10.0% in 
2013. 
 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Figure 20: China’s Manufacturing Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
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China’s Manufacturing Value-Added was the highest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s 
Manufacturing Value-Added averaged 32.5% of GDP, hitting a peak of 34.0% in 1993 and 
low of 31.4% in 2002. China’s Manufacturing Value-Added benefitted from its ascension to 
the WTO and the outsourcing trend which increase the number and production scale of facto-
ries along coastal cities. 
 
 
Services 
 
Figure 21: China’s Services Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s Services Value-Added was the lowest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s Services 
Value-Added averaged 38.7% of GDP, hitting a peak of 46.1% in 2013 and low of 31.5% in 
1990. 
 
 
Terms of Trade 
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Figure 22: China’s Terms of Trade 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s Terms of Trade Index was the lowest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s Terms of 
Trade Index averaged 85.3, hitting a peak of 102.2 in 2001 and low of 70.1 in 2011. 
 
Population and Demography 
 
Figure 23: China’s Total Population, Number of People 
 
Source: World Bank 
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China’s population was the highest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s population averaged 
1.3 billion people, hitting a peak of 1.4 billion people in 2013 and low of 1.1 billion people in 
1990.  
 
 
Figure 24: China’s Population Growth Rate (%) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s population growth was below average amongst its BRICS peers. China’s population 
grew, on average, by 0.8%, hitting a peak of 1.5% in 1990 and low of 0.5% in 2013.  
 
 
Urban and Rural Mix 
 
Figure 25: China’s Urban and Rural Population Mix, Percentage of Population 
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Source: World Bank 
 
China’s urban and rural population mix was the average amongst its BRICS peers. China’s 
urban and rural population mix averaged 61.3% and 38.7% for rural and urban population 
respectively, with people living in urban areas hitting a peak of 53.2% and the population liv-
ing in rural areas hitting a low of 46.8% in 2013.  
 
 
Figure 26: China’s Rural and Urban Population Growth (%) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s urban and rural population growth was the highest and below average respectively 
amongst its BRICS peers. China’s urban and rural population grew, on average, by 3.8% and 
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-1.1%, urban population growth hitting a peak of 4.6% in 1991 and rural population growth 
hitting a low of 2.2% in 2013.  
 
 
Age 
 
Figure 27: China’s Population Age Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s population age mix was below average for 0-14 year’s old category, average for 15-
64 years old and 65 years and older categories amongst its BRICS peers. China’s population 
mix for 15-64 years old averaged 69.1%, peaking of 73.5% in 2010 and hitting a low of 
64.9% in 1990.  
 
 
Gender Mix 
 
Figure 28: China’s Population Gender Mix, Percentage of Population 
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Source: World Bank 
 
China’s population gender mix was jointly the highest with Russia for male amongst its 
BRICS peers. China’s population gender mix averaged 50.8% for male, with the male popu-
lation hitting a peak of 50.9% in 2013 and a low of 50.7% in 1990.  
 
 
Labor Force Participation 
 
Figure 29: China’s Labor Force Participation Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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China’s labor force participation rate was the highest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s labor 
force participation rate averaged 75.3%, with the labor force participation rate hitting a peak 
of 78.9% in 1990 and a low of 70.7% in 2010. 
 
 
Employment 
 
Figure 30: China’s Employment Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s employment rate was the highest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s employment rate 
averaged 65.9%, with the employment rate hitting a peak of 69.8% in 1992 and a low of 
61.3% in 2010.  
 
Savings and Household Consumption 
 
Figure 31: China’s Savings Rate, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
China’s savings rate is the highest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s savings rate averaged 
44.9%, with the savings rate hitting a peak of 52.7% in 2009 and savings rate hitting a low of 
37.5% in 2000.  
 
 
Figure 32: China’s Household Consumption, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s household consumption was the lowest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s household 
consumption averaged 40.7%, with the household consumption hitting a peak of 47.0% in 
1990 and household consumption hitting a low of 33.9% in 2009.  
  28"
 
 
Level of Indebtedness 
 
 
Absolute Indebtedness 
 
Figure 33: China’s External Debt Stock, Percentage of GNI 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
China’s level of indebtedness was the lowest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s level of in-
debtedness averaged 13.2%, with the level of indebtedness hitting a peak of 19.5% in 1993 
and level of indebtedness hitting a low of 8.3% in 2008.  
 
Ability to Repay Debt Interest 
 
Figure N: China’s Interest Payment on External Debt, Percentage of GNI 
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Source: World Bank 
 
China’s ability to service its debt was the highest amongst its BRICS peers. China’s interest 
payments on external debt (% of GNI) averaged 0.56%, hitting a peak of 0.98% in 1991 and 
a low of 0.06% in 2013.  
 
INDIA 
 
Economy 
 
GDP 
 
Figure 34: India’s Real GDP Growth 1990-2013 (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
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Source: World Bank 
 
India’s real GDP growth was above average amongst its BRICS peers. The economy grew, 
on average, by 6.4%, hitting a peak of 10.3% in 2010 and low of 1.1% in 1991. India’s econ-
omy benefited from continued industrialization of its economy driven by the outsourcing 
trends and government measures to reduce poverty levels. 
 
GDP Per Capita 
 
Figure 35: India’s GDP Per Capita Growth (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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India’s real GDP per capita growth was above average amongst its BRICS peers. Real GDP 
per capita grew, on average, by 4.7%, hitting a peak of 8.8% in 2010 and low of -0.9% in 
1991. 
 
 
Economic Mix 
 
Agriculture 
 
Figure 36: India’s Agriculture Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
India’s Agriculture Value-Added was the highest amongst its BRICS peers. Agriculture Val-
ue-Added averaged 22.6%, hitting a peak of 29.4% in 1991 and low of 17.5% in 2012.  
 
Manufacturing 
 
Figure 37: India’s Manufacturing Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
India’s Manufacturing Value-Added was the lowest amongst its BRICS peers. India’s Manu-
facturing Value-Added averaged 15.3%, hitting a peak of 17.3% in 1995 and low of 12.9% in 
2013.  
 
 
Services 
 
Figure 38: India’s Services Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
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India’s Services Value-Added was below average amongst its BRICS peers. India’s Services 
Value-Added averaged 50.7%, hitting a peak of 57.0% in 2013 and low of 44.5% in 1990. 
 
 
Terms of Trade 
Figure 39: India’s Terms of Trade 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
India’s Terms of Trade was below average amongst its BRICS peers. India’s Terms of Trade 
Index averaged 111.9, hitting a peak of 132.5 in 2010 and low of 86.2 in 2004. 
 
 
Population and Demography 
 
 
Figure 40: India’s Total Population 
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Source: World Bank 
 
India’s is the second most populous country amongst its BRICS peers. India’s population av-
eraged 1.1 billion people, hitting a peak of 1.3 billion people in 2013 and low of 868.9 mil-
lion people in 1990.  
 
 
Figure N: India’s Population Growth (%) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
India’s population growth was above the average amongst its BRICS peers. India’s popula-
tion grew, on average, by 1.6%, hitting a peak of 2.0% in 1990 and low of 1.2% in 2013.  
 
Urban and Rural Mix 
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Figure 41: India’s Urban and Rural Population Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
India’s the highest proportion of rural population and lowest proportion of urban population 
amongst its BRICS peers. India’s urban and rural population mix averaged 71.6% and 28.4% 
for rural and urban population proportion respectively, with people living in urban areas hit-
ting a peak of 32% and the population living in rural areas hitting a low of 68% in 2013. 
 
Figure 42: India’s Rural and Urban Population Growth 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
India’s rural and urban population growth was the highest and below the average amongst its 
BRICS peers. India’s urban and rural population grew, on average, by 1.2% and 2.6% respec-
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tively, with urban population growth hitting a peak of 3.0% in 1990 and rural population 
growth hitting a low of 0.7% in 2013.  
 
Age 
 
Figure 43: India’s Population Age Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
India’s population has the highest proportion 0-14 year olds amongst its BRICS peers. India’s 
population mix for 0-14 year olds averaged 33.5%, peaked at 37.5% in 1990 and hitting a low 
of 29.1% in 2013.  
 
Gender Mix 
 
Figure 44: India’s Population Gender Mix, Percentage of Population 
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Source: World Bank 
 
India’s population gender mix was below the average for amongst its BRICS peers. India’s 
population gender mix averaged 49.2% for male and 48.2 for females, with the female popu-
lation hitting a peak of 48.3% and the male population hitting a low of 49.1% in 2013. 
 
 
Labor Force Participation 
 
Figure 45: India’s Labor Force Participation Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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India’s labor force participation rate was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. India’s 
labor force participation rate averaged 59.0%, with the labor force participation rate hitting a 
peak of 60.9% in 2003 and a low of 54.1% in 2012.  
 
Employment 
 
Figure 46: India’s Employment Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
India’s employment rate was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. India’s employ-
ment rate averaged 56.5%, with the employment participation rate hitting a peak of 58.6% in 
1994 and a low of 52.2% in 2013.  
 
Savings and Household Consumption 
 
Figure 47: India’s Savings Rate, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
India’s savings rate was above average amongst its BRICS peers. India’s savings rate aver-
aged 26.5%, with the savings rate hitting a peak of 34.0% in 2007 and savings rate hitting a 
low of 20.9% in 1996.  
 
Figure 48: India’s Household Consumption, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source World Bank 
 
India’s household consumption is the highest amongst its BRICS peers. India’s household 
consumption averaged 62.0%, with the household consumption hitting a peak of 68.2% in 
1996 and household consumption hitting a low of 55.7% in 2007. 
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Level of Indebtedness 
 
 
Absolute Indebtedness 
 
Figure 49: India’s External Debt Stock, Percentage of GNI 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
India’s level of indebtedness was above average amongst its BRICS peers. India’s level of 
indebtedness averaged 22.3%, with the level of indebtedness hitting a peak of 33.2% in 1993 
and level of indebtedness hitting a low of 14.6% in 2005.  
 
Ability to Repay Debt Interest 
 
Figure 50: India’s Interest Payment on External Debt, Percentage of GNI 
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Source: World Bank 
 
India’s ability to service its debt was above average amongst its BRICS peers. India’s interest 
payments on external debt (% of GNI) averaged 0.9%, hitting a peak of 1.7% in 1991 and a 
low of 0.3% in 2010.  
 
BRAZIL 
 
Economy 
 
GDP 
 
Figure 51: Brazil’s Real GDP Growth 1990-2013 (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s real GDP growth is the below average amongst its BRICS peers. The economy grew, 
on average, by 2.7%, hitting a peak of 7.5% in 2010 and low of -4.3% in 1990. Brazil’s 
economy benefited from the commodity super-cycle at the turn of the millennia7. 
 
GDP Per Capita 
 
Figure 52: Brazil’s GDP Per Capita Growth (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
                                               
7 Cardoso and Teles (2009) 
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Brazil’s real GDP per capita growth was below average amongst its BRICS peers. Real GDP 
per capita grew, on average, by 1.4%, hitting a peak of 6.6% in 2010 and low of -5.9% in 
1990. 
 
 
Economic Mix 
 
Agriculture 
 
Figure 53: Brazil’s Agriculture Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s Agriculture Value-Added was below average amongst its BRICS peers. Agriculture 
Value-Added averaged 6.3%, hitting a peak of 9.9% in 1994 and low of 5.3% in 2010.  
 
Manufacturing 
 
Figure 54: Brazil’s Manufacturing Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s Manufacturing Value-Added was above average amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s 
Manufacturing Value-Added averaged 18.1%, hitting a peak of 26.8% in 1994 and low of 
13.0% in 2012. 
 
 
Services 
 
Figure 55: Brazil’s Services Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
  45"
Brazil’s Services Value-Added was jointly the highest with South Africa amongst its BRICS 
peers. Brazil’s Services Value-Added averaged 64.0%, hitting a peak of 69.3% in 2013 and 
low of 50.1% in 1993.  
 
 
Terms of Trade 
 
 
Figure 56: Brazil’s Terms of Trade 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s Terms of Trade was below average amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s Terms of 
Trade Index averaged 109.6, hitting a peak of 134.9 in 2011 and low of 97.0 in 2003.  
 
 
Population and Demography 
 
 
Figure 57: Brazil’s Total Population 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s population was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s population av-
eraged 176.9 million people, hitting a peak of 200.4 million people in 2013 and low of 149.6 
million people in 1990.  
 
 
Figure 58: Brazil’s Population Growth 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s population growth was the average amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s population 
grew, on average, by 1.3%, hitting a peak of 1.7% in 1990 and low of 0.9% in 2013.  
 
Urban and Rural Mix 
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Figure 59: Brazil’s Urban and Rural Population Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil has the highest urban population and the lowest rural population amongst its BRICS 
peers. Brazil’s urban and rural population mix averaged 80.7% and 19.3% respectively, with 
people living in urban areas hitting a peak of 85.2% and the population living in rural areas 
hitting a low of 14.8% in 2013.  
 
Figure 60: Brazil’s Rural and Urban Population Growth 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil has the highest negative growth for its rural population and an urban population 
growth rate that was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s urban and rural 
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population grew, on average, 1.9% and -1.2% respectively. Urban population growth hit a 
peak of 2.8% in 1990 and rural population growth hit a low of -2.2% in 2000.  
 
Age 
 
Figure 61: Brazil’s Population Age Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s population age mix for all age categories were the average amongst its BRICS peers. 
Brazil’s population for age groups of 0-14, 15-64 and, 65+ averaged 29.3%, 64.9% and 5.8% 
respectively.  The population mix for 0-14, 15-64 and, 65+ peaked at 35.3%, 68.4% and 
7.5% in 1990, 2013 and 2013 respectively whilst hitting a low of 24.1%, 60.3% and 4.5% in 
2013, 1990 and 1990 respectively.  
 
Gender Mix 
 
Figure 62: Brazil’s Population Gender Mix, Percentage of Population 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s population of female and male was above and below the average amongst its BRICS 
peers respectively. Brazil’s population gender mix averaged 50.6% for females and 49.2% for 
males. The female and male population hit a peak of 50.8% and 49.3% in 2013 and 1990 re-
spectively, and a low of 50.3% and 49.1% in 1990 and 2013 respectively.  
 
Labor Force Participation 
 
Figure 63: Brazil’s Labor Force Participation Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Brazil’s labor force participation rate was above the average amongst its BRICS peers. Bra-
zil’s labor force participation rate averaged 68.8%, with the labor force participation rate hit-
ting a peak of 70.2% in 2005 and a low of 64.6% in 1990.  
 
Employment 
 
Figure 64: Brazil’s Employment Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s employment rate was above the average amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s employ-
ment rate averaged 63.6%, with the employment participation rate hitting a peak of 65.6% in 
2012 and 2013 and a low of 61.5% in 2001.  
 
Savings and Household Consumption 
 
Figure 65 Brazil’s Savings Rate, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s savings rate was the lowest amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s savings rate averaged 
18.5%, with the savings rate hitting a peak of 22.5% in 1994 and savings rate hitting a low of 
15.0% in 1999.  
 
Figure 66: Brazil’s Household Consumption, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source World Bank 
 
Brazil’s household consumption was above average amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s 
household consumption averaged 61.7%, with the household consumption hitting a peak of 
64.9% in 1997 and household consumption hitting a low of 58.9% in 2008.  
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Level of Indebtedness 
 
 
Absolute Indebtedness 
 
Figure 67: Brazil’s External Debt Stock, Percentage of GNI 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s level of indebtedness was the highest amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s level of in-
debtedness averaged 27.8%, with the level of indebtedness hitting a peak of 47.7% in 2002 
and level of indebtedness hitting a low of 16.3% in 2008.  
 
Ability to Repay Debt Interest 
 
Figure 68: Brazil’s Interest Payment on External Debt, Percentage of GNI 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Brazil’s ability to service its debt was the lowest amongst its BRICS peers. Brazil’s interest 
payment (% of GNI) averaged 1.5%, hitting a peak of 3.2% in 2001 and a low of 0.5% in 
1990.  
 
RUSSIA 
 
Economy 
 
GDP 
 
Figure 69: Russia’s Real GDP Growth 1990-2013 (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Russia’s real GDP growth was the weakest amongst its BRICS peers. The economy grew, on 
average, by 0.8%, hitting a peak of 10.0% in 2000 and low of -14.5% in 1992. Russia’s econ-
omy benefited high oil prices at the turn of the millennia. 
 
 
GDP Per Capita 
 
Figure 70: Russia’s GDP Per Capita Growth (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Russia’s real GDP per capita growth was below average amongst its BRICS peers. The econ-
omy grew, on average, by 0.9%, hitting a peak of 10.5% in 2000 and low of -14.6% in 1992. 
 
Economic Mix 
 
Agriculture  
Figure 71: Russia’s Agriculture Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
Russia’s Agriculture Value-Added was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. Agricul-
ture Value-Added averaged 6.6%, hitting a peak of 16.6% in 1990 and low of 3.9% in 2012.  
 
Manufacturing 
 
Figure 72: Russia’s Manufacturing Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Russia’s Manufacturing Value-Added was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. Rus-
sia’s Manufacturing Value-Added averaged 16.4%, hitting a peak of 18.3% in 2005 and low 
of 14.8% in 2013.  
 
Services 
 
Figure 73: Russia’s Services Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Russia’s Services Value-Added was above average amongst its BRICS peers. Russia’s Ser-
vices Value-Added averaged 55.2%, hitting a peak of 61.7% in 2009 and low of 35.0% in 
1990.  
 
 
Terms of Trade 
 
Figure 74: Russia’s Terms of Trade 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Russia’s Terms of Trade was the highest amongst its BRICS peers. Russia’s Terms of Trade 
Index averaged 171.7, hitting a peak of 250 in 2012 and low of 92.9 in 2002.  
 
Population and Demography 
 
 
Figure 75: Russia’s Total Population 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Russia’s population was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. Russia’s population 
averaged 145.5 million people, hitting a peak of 148.7 million people in 1992 and low of 
141.9 million people in 2009.  
 
 
Figure 76: Russia’s Population Growth 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Russia’s population growth was the lowest amongst its BRICS peers. Russia’s population 
grew, on average, by -0.1% p.a., hitting a peak of 0.4% p.a. in 1990 and low of -0.6% p.a. in 
2004.  
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Urban and Rural Mix 
 
Figure 77: Russia’s Urban and Rural Population Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Russia has the second highest urban and second lowest rural population mix amongst its 
BRICS peers. Russia’s urban and rural population mix averaged 73.5% and 26.5% respec-
tively, with people living in urban areas hitting a peak of 73.9% and the population living in 
rural areas hitting a low of 26.1% in 2013.  
 
Figure 78: Russia’s Rural and Urban Population Growth 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Russia has the lowest urban and a below average rural population growth amongst its BRICS 
peers. Russia’s urban and rural population grew, on average, by -0.1% p.a. and -0.2% p.a. 
respectively. Urban population growth hit a peak of 0.5% in 2011 and rural population 
growth hitting a low of -0.8% in 2004.  
 
Age 
 
Figure 79: Russia’s Population Age Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Russia has the largest proportion of 15-64 year old and 65 years and over population, and a 
below average proportion of 0-14 year old amongst its BRICS peers. Russia’s population mix 
for 0-14 year old, 15-64 year old, and 65 years and over averaged 18.0%, 69.4% and 12.6% 
respectively, peaking of 23.0%, 72.0% and 13.8% in 1990, 2010 and 2005 respectively, and 
hitting a low of 14.7%, 66.4% and 10.2% in 2008, 1993 and 1990 respectively. 
 
Gender Mix 
 
Figure 80: Russia’s Population Gender Mix, Percentage of Population 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Russia has the largest population of females and male (jointly with China) amongst its 
BRICS peers. Russia’s female and male population averaged 53.5% and 50.8% respectively, 
with the female and male population hitting a peak of 53.9% and 50.9% in 2013 and a low of 
53.2% and 50.7% in 1993 and 1990 respectively.  
 
Labor Force Participation 
 
Figure 81: Russia’s Labor Force Participation Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Russia’s labor force participation rate was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. Rus-
sia’s labor force participation rate averaged 62.0%, with the labor force participation rate hit-
ting a peak of 67.2% in 1990 and a low of 57.0% in 1998.  
 
Employment 
 
Figure 82: Russia’s Employment Rate, Percentage of Population Aged 15+ 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Russia’s employment rate was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. Russia’s em-
ployment rate averaged 56.6%, with the employment participation rate hitting a peak of 
61.7% in 1992 and a low of 49.4% in 1998. 
 
Savings and Household Consumption 
 
Figure 83: Russia’s Savings Rate, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
Russia had the second highest savings rate amongst its BRICS peers. Russia’s savings rate 
averaged 32.1%, with the savings rate hitting a peak of 48.7% in 1992 and savings rate hit-
ting a low of 21.6% in 1998.  
 
Figure 84: Russia’s Household Consumption, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source World Bank 
 
Russia’s household consumption second lowest amongst its BRICS peers. Russia’s house-
hold consumption averaged 49.8%, with the household consumption hitting a peak of 59.6% 
in 1998 and household consumption hitting a low of 37.5% in 1992.  
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Indebtedness 
Russia data on indebtedness is unavailable on the World Bank Development Indicators. 
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Economy 
 
GDP 
Figure 85: South Africa’s Real GDP Growth 1990-2013 (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s real GDP growth was below average amongst its BRICS peers. The economy 
grew, on average, by 2.6%, hitting a peak of 5.6% in 2006 and low of -2.1% in 1992. South 
Africa’s economy benefited investment in large-scale infrastructure projects, financial ser-
vices reform and the commodity super-cycle at the turn of the millennia. 
 
 
GDP Per Capita 
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Figure 86: South Africa’s GDP Per Capita Growth (%, Constant 2005 US Dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s real GDP per capita growth was the weakest amongst its BRICS peers. The 
economy grew, on average, by 0.8%, hitting a peak of 4.2% in 2006 and 2007, and low of -
4.2% in 1992.  
 
Economic Mix 
 
Agriculture 
 
Figure 87: South Africa’s Agriculture Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
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South Africa’s Agriculture Value-Added was the lowest amongst its BRICS peers. Agricul-
ture Value-Added averaged 3.5%, hitting a peak of 4.6% in 1990 and low of 2.4% in 2013. 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Figure 88: South Africa’s Manufacturing Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s Manufacturing Value-Added was above the average amongst its BRICS peers. 
South Africa’s Manufacturing Value-Added averaged 18%, 4%, hitting a peak of 23.6% in 
1990 and low of 11.6% in 2013. 
 
Services 
 
Figure 89: South Africa’s Services Value-Add, Percentage of GDP 
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Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s Services Value-Added was jointly the highest with Brazil amongst its BRICS 
peers. South Africa’s Services Value-Added averaged 64%, hitting a peak of 70.0% in 2013 
and low of 55.3% in 1990.  
 
 
Terms of Trade 
 
 
Figure 90: South Africa’s Terms of Trade 
 
Source: World Bank 
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South Africa’s Terms of Trade was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. South Afri-
ca’s Terms of Trade Index averaged 102.6, hitting a peak of 109.5 in 2007 and low of 95.2 in 
2002.  
 
 
Population and Demography 
 
 
Figure 91: South Africa’s Total Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s has the smallest population amongst its BRICS peers. South Africa’s popula-
tion averaged 44.5 million people, hitting a peak of 53.0 million people in 2013 and low of 
35.2 million people in 1990. 
 
 
Figure 92: South Africa’s Population Growth 
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Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s population growth was above the average amongst its BRICS peers. South 
Africa’s population grew, on average, by 1.8% p.a., hitting a peak of 2.5% p.a. in 2000 and 
low of 1.3% p.a. in 2003.  
 
Urban and Rural Mix 
 
Figure 93: South Africa’s Urban and Rural Population Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
South Africa’s urban and rural population mixes were above and below the average amongst 
its BRICS peers respectively. South Africa’s urban and rural population averaged 57.8% and 
42.2% of total population respectively. People living in urban areas hitting a peak of 63.8% 
and the population living in rural areas hit a low of 36.2% in 2013.  
  70"
 
Figure 94: South Africa’s Rural and Urban Population Growth 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s has the second highest rural and urban population growth rate amongst its 
BRICS peers. South Africa’s urban and rural population grew, on average, by 2.7% and 0.6% 
respectively, with urban population growth hitting a peak of 3.3% in 2000 and rural popula-
tion growth hitting a low of -0.1% in 2012.  
 
Age 
 
Figure 95: South Africa’s Population Age Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
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South Africa has the second highest proportion of 0-14 year old population and below the 
average proportion of 15-64 year old, and 65 years and over in its population amongst its 
BRICS peers. South Africa’s population of 0-14 year old, 15-64 year old, and 65 years and 
over averaged 33%, 62.9% and 4.1% respectively. The proportion of 0-14 year old, 15-64 
year old, and 65 years and over peaked at 38.9%, 65.1% and 5.5% in 1990, 2009 and 2013 
respectively whilst hitting a low of 29.5%, 57.9% and 3.2% in 2013, 1990 and 1990 respec-
tively.  
 
Gender Mix 
 
Figure 96: South Africa’s Population Gender Mix, Percentage of Population 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa has the second highest proportion of female and below average proportion of 
males in its population mix amongst its BRICS peers. South Africa’s ratio of female and 
male averaged 51.1% and 49.2% respectively. The population for female and male hit a peak 
of 51.5% and 49.3% in 2011 and 1990 respectively, and a low of 50.5% and 49.1% in 1990 
and 2013 respectively.  
 
Labor Force Participation 
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Figure 97: South Africa’s Labor Force Participation Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s labor force participation rate was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. 
South Africa’s labor force participation rate averaged 54.4%, with the labor force participa-
tion rate hitting a peak of 57.0% in 2001 and a low of 51.3% in 2010 and 2011. 
 
Employment 
 
Figure 98: South Africa’s Employment Rate, (% of Population Aged 15+) 
 
Source: World Bank 
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South Africa’s employment rate was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. South Af-
rica’s employment rate averaged 45.4%, with the employment participation rate hitting a 
peak of 50.2% in 2001 and a low of 39.4% in 1990. 
 
Savings and Household Consumption 
 
Figure 99: South Africa’s Savings Rate, Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s savings rate was below the average amongst its BRICS peers. South Africa’s 
savings rate averaged 18.9%, with the savings rate hitting a peak of 23.2% in 1990 and sav-
ings rate hitting a low of 16.6% in 2013.  
 
Figure 100: South Africa’s Household Consumption, Percentage of GDP 
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Source World Bank 
 
South Africa’s household consumption was above the average amongst its BRICS peers. 
South Africa’s household consumption averaged 61.4%, with the household consumption 
hitting a peak of 63.1% in 2006 and household consumption hitting a low of 57.1% in 1990.  
 
Level of Indebtedness 
 
 
Absolute Indebtedness 
 
Figure 101: South Africa’s External Debt Stock, Percentage of GNI 
 
Source: World Bank 
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South Africa’s level of indebtedness was above the average amongst its BRICS peers. South 
Africa’s level of indebtedness averaged 24.4%, with the level of indebtedness hitting a peak 
of 40.7% in 2013 and level of indebtedness hitting a low of 16.3% in 1990.  
 
Ability to Repay Debt Interest 
 
Figure 102: South Africa’s Interest Payment on External Debt, Percentage of GNI 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
South Africa’s ability to service its debt was the average amongst its BRICS peers. South Af-
rica’s interest payments on external debt (% of GNI) averaged 1.0%, a peak of 1.2% in 2002 
and a low of 0.6% in 2004. 
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China’s International Presence 
 
What has been China’s history of participation in status-quo international organiza-
tions? During the Mao Zedong (“Chairman Mao”) era, due to the internal political upheav-
al and political ideology, China has had very little interaction with the outside world. Given 
China’s deep sense of historical grievance from nearly a century of humiliation, deep rooted 
sense of insecurity and the political climate of the Cold War, China found itself isolated from 
the Bretton Woods international system that is dominated by the US. Instead, due to ideolog-
ical affinity, China aligned itself with the Soviet Union and the non-aligned movement. In 
1965, China even called for an alternative “revolutionary United Nations” because it viewed 
the United Nations as a puppet of the Western World (Shield 2013 P151). Throughout this 
period, China only joined one significant international organization – the United Nations in 
1971. For the following decade, China rarely exercised its veto power with the United Nation 
Security Council. (Abdera 2014 P95).  
 
 After Deng Xiaoping (“Chairman Deng”) took over leadership of the CCP and consolidat-
ed his power by the early 1980s, China abandoned its isolationist policies in favor of a more 
passive position vis-a-vis international organizations. In the early 1980s, China joined inter-
national organizations such as Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In return, China received significant support from these or-
ganizations (Shield 2013 P151). With increased access to foreign capital and markets, China 
gained tremendous benefits from this international order and its economy grew while it con-
tinued watching and learning from the West. 
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During the Jiang Zemin (“Chairman Jiang”) period, China slowly began to lead or co-
launch new multilateral initiatives. In 1996, Russia and China co-launched the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization (SCO) with the original goal of cooperating on mutual security issues 
in Central Asia. China slowly assumed the leadership position by enhancing and expanding 
the SCO’s mandate toward economic and development cooperation programs (Abdenu 2014 
P95). 
 
 By early 2000s, China further sought membership in other international organizations. It 
wanted to learn about these institutions to enhance its own political and economic develop-
ment. During this period, China followed the established norms within these organizations 
and only took selective activist roles (Shield 2013 P150). After 15 years of difficult negotia-
tions China finally joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. The demanding ap-
plication process and stringent WTO rules had a major impact on China’s international trade 
relations and its own domestic economic situation. (Shield 2013 P151) 
 
Until the global financial crisis in 2008, China was an active participant in the WTO Disputes 
Settlement Body. In fact, China had even better records of compliance with rulings against it 
than had either the European Union (EU) or the United States (Shield 2013 P151). However, 
China had also repeatedly failed to follow the WTO’s government procurement agreement 
and continued to face allegations of state-sponsored commercial espionage and unfair gov-
ernment subsidies for its companies (Shield 2013 P152) 
 
During this period, China became more assertive in the WTO and a leading advocate for re-
form of the IMF and the World Bank. By 2007, China had increased its membership from a 
single International Governmental Organization (IGO) and 58 Nongovernmental Organiza-
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tion (NGO) s to 49 IGOs and 1568 NGOs. (Abdenur 2014 P95) Fudan University Professor 
Ren Xiao labeled Chinese action from 2000-2008 as “a reform-minded status quo power”. 
(Shield 2013 P152) 
 
 According to University of Auckland professor Gerald Chan, since the post 2008 financial 
crisis, China has viewed the current international organizations as “unequal, undemocratic 
and therefore, unjust”. (Shield 2013 P149) However, China’s engagement in the world eco-
nomic governance system will always be principled on the realpolitik of national interests. It 
will remain subordinate to social stability and domestic economic development. China will 
actively engage in activities where the governance agenda matches its own national needs. In 
short, China’s view of global economic governance systems must follow the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other nations and must not lead to any loss of China’s 
national sovereignty (Shield 2013 P150). 
 
Through incremental changes during the past sixty years rather than a conscious policy, Chi-
na improved its diplomatic skills, acquiring knowledge, experience and negotiation styles re-
quired to manage multilateral cooperation. In Deng Xiaoping’s era, China acted as a mere 
follower of rules, however, under President Xi Jinping, China plays an active role in setting 
global agendas in multilateral institution building. China has risen to become a legitimate 
global player in international organizations. (Abdenur 2014 P95)   
 
Creation of a BRICS Bank 
 
Since the financial crisis in 2008, emerging and developing countries have led the growth in 
the world economy. They have dramatically increased their share in global GDP and in glob-
al economic growth. Led by countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
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(BRICS), their accumulation of foreign exchange reserves have grown remarkably during the 
last decades. The majority of these financial resources are invested in developed countries, 
with relatively low yield return. (Griffith-Jones 2014 P1). Analysts have pointed out the need 
for infrastructure and environmentally sustainable forms of development in many parts of the 
emerging and developing world, and an estimated $1 trillion dollars are required annually 
beyond what is being spent (Griffith-Jones 2014 P1). The emerging and developing econo-
mies such as BRICS have the necessary capital to create a new development bank that could 
finance such developmental projects worldwide (Griffith-Jones 2014 P1). 
 
BRICS consider the IMF and the World Bank to be excessively controlled by Western na-
tions. The BRICS government also opposes some of the demands that Western financial in-
stitutions place on borrowers, such as conditions that their projects must support gender 
equality, civil rights and meet ecological standards. Furthermore, these Western institutions 
do not appreciate the BRICS nations own growing economic and political influence in the 
world (Weitz 2014 para4).  Such an international institution should be viewed as a comple-
ment to the existing international institutions such as IMF, ADB and WB. It should not be 
viewed as a substitute to the existing financial institutions. The new institution would only 
strengthen the voice of developing economies and provide much needed additional finance 
for economic development. (Griffith-Jones 2014 P1) 
 
BRIC emerged in 2006 under the initiative of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and 
on June 16, 2009, the first summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Since then, the BRIC 
heads of state have met annually in Brasilia (2010), Sanya (2011 with the entry of South Af-
rica), New Delhi (2012), Durban (2013) and Fortaleza (2014) (Abdenur 2014 P87). During 
the last BRICS summit, held in Durban South Africa in 2013, the five heads of state agreed 
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on a new development bank, along with a contingency reserve arrangement, a business coun-
cil and a think tank council (Abdenur 2014 P88). 
 
On the sixth annual meeting held in Brazil on 2014, the BRICS’ collective statement com-
plained that “international governance structures designed within a different power configu-
ration show increasingly evident signs of losing legitimacy and effectiveness, as transitional 
and ad-hoc arrangements become increasingly prevalent, often at the expense of multilateral-
ism”. (Weitz 2014 para 9) Finally at this summit, all five nations agreed to launch two joint 
financial institutions; alongside the long-discussed National Development Bank or BRICS 
Bank, the BRICS leaders also proposed establishing a Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA). The BRICS bank will provide capital for major national infrastructure and sustaina-
ble development projects in developing nations. The National Development Bank had been 
given $50 billion in initial USD capital, with capital increase to $100 billion USD over time. 
(China-U.S. Focus, 2014, para2) Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa will initially 
contribute $10 billion USD each to bring the total to $50 billion USD. No member can in-
crease its share of capital without the concurrence of the other four members. Also, the bank 
members must work on an equal-share voting basis. This was a primary requirement of India. 
(Victory for Modi, India as BRICS summit clears setting up of a new development bank, 
2014, para. 10) Initially, the capital base is only to be used to finance infrastructure and sus-
tainable development projects in the BRICS countries, but other low- and middle-income 
countries will be able buy in and apply for funding (Desai, 2014, para. 2). The CRA will pro-
vide a guideline for currency swaps to help their countries manage short-term liquidity and 
balance of payment crises. China would commit $41 billion; Brazil, India and Russia would 
each commit $18 billion and South Africa would commit 5 billion. The headquarters of the 
bank will be in Shanghai, an Indian will be the first president, a Brazilian will head the 
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Bank’s board of directors, a Russian will be the chair of its governors and the National De-
velopment Bank’s first regional center will be located in South Africa. (China-U.S. Focus, 
2014 para. 1) 
 
Back in 2006, the initial summit meeting focused on the global economic crisis. Today, the 
expanded agenda includes developmental, technological and political cooperation. The main 
reason for the group creation was a common interest in reforming the global governance sys-
tems. All BRICS members agree that certain developing nations had become the main drivers 
of regional and/or global economic growth, but the major international organizations remain 
dominated by the select few countries that initially set the rules at the end of WWII. (Ab-
denur 2014 P87)  
 
The emerging power of these rising BRICS countries has outpaced increases in their voice in 
the World Bank and the IMF. In recent years, South-South economic cooperation has in-
creased dramatically. African countries’ most important trading partner is now China. Brazil 
now has more embassies in Africa than does the United Kingdom. The value of South-South 
trade now exceeds North-South trade by $2.2 trillion. China, Brazil, and India are all becom-
ing larger donors to the lower income countries of the Southern region. Realistically speak-
ing, the BRICS bank is the result of a two-decades-long process of greater economic en-
gagement among developing countries. (Desai, 2014 para 3) 
 
Why is there a need for a BRICS Bank? 
 
China and its fellow members are seen as rogues who exploit the system but do not commit 
to its sustainability. It cannot be denied that the investments for the last fifty years by the 
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West to the rest of the world are vast, particularly the West’s implementation and promotion 
of liberal ideas, which include free market economy coupled with democracy. From their 
point of view, financial capitalism is most efficient when all can maximize benefits through 
market principles. In theory and reality, this system has consequences, such as widening ine-
quality through international trade as those who have open market and resources. Those na-
tions with capital, land and labor are the main beneficiaries, and those who are not willing to 
offer up their people and resources are pressured to do so, a policy which Marxist systems are 
resistant to implement.  
 
If China still pays homage to their old Communist belief and identifies itself as a developing 
country as it often claims, even if just in words and not in deeds, it is to understandable that 
China opposes the current international regime and this may form some of the impetus to set 
up new financial institutions for the benefit of the “Third World” or global South. However, 
is this the only possible reason? To answer the question whether the Bretton Woods regime 
or Washington Consensus is justifiable for the greater good of all economies is a daunting 
task, however some insights from International Relations Theory and International Political 
Economy perspectives could also be drawn from recent developments. For example, are 
those initiatives by developing countries simply to establish a new regime by offering an al-
ternative source of funds, or more narrowly, to benefit industrialized developing countries by 
channeling resources from less-endowed states in return for aid, masquerading under the 
name of South-South cooperation, or something more cooperative and constructive to im-
prove or complement the old regime. 
  
Answers to such question naturally depend on where one stands as regards this controversial 
topic and may not be the same for all concerned. In this section, this paper examines views 
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and data regarding the old regime whose authority might be undermined by the current chal-
lenges (i.e. establishment of a BRICS bank), starting from composition and characteristics of 
the major international financial institutions, namely the IMF, the World Bank Group and the 
ADB with more regional focus and how those institutions and the countries which comprise 
them have reacted to current initiatives. 
 
Good Old Regime? 
 
What brought China and the follower states to the idea of those new institutions continues to 
be a matter of speculation. Many existing institutions may see the BRICS bank and the AIIB 
as challenges to the current international monetary system with IMF and World Bank at its 
core. The somewhat unsettling mood is aired from caveats made by those on the West side at 
the early stage of new bank formulation that the challenge for the AIIB is to “adopt interna-
tional best practices in procurement and environmental and social standards on its projects 
and programs” (Xinhua Net, 2014). This brings to mind the US cliché of demanding that 
China to be a responsible great power (Lake, 1996) and brings to mind the narrative of the 
“China Threat” theorists of the Realism School of IR Theory. Such ways of thinking may be 
reduced to three possible explanations: 1.) balance of power, 2.) institutionalization drive, 
and 3.) transformation of self-image, each of which represents the IR theories – realism, ide-
alism and constructivism, respectively. Before looking closer into the first explanation, this 
paper will briefly cover the second and third explanations. The second explanation assumes 
that based on China’s growing presence in Asia and beyond, and inter-connectedness within 
Asia and among the Third World, a new order to govern the non-Western world has been ini-
tiated. Putting Brazil and South Africa aside for a while, one can see how far the inter-
regional interactions are put forward in Asia. Asian nations have ASEAN (+3), APEC and 
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the East Asia Forum to start with as platforms for regional discourse and, possibly, integra-
tion. However, according to Professor Richard W. Hu of the University of Hong Kong, 
ASEAN is like a taxi without a taxi driver, meaning that the members go around the region to 
talk, which is an ASEAN way of making consensus, but no one wants to acknowledge (or 
realizes) the importance of taking leadership to further strengthen institutionalization in the 
region. Professor Hu contrasts this with the EU, which stands on a firm ground with a par-
liament, executive council, commission, court of justice, under which it branches out to agen-
cies by industry or by social developmental goal. Having said that, ASEAN is a successful 
case of a regional institution compared to what African or Latin American states have. 
Against this backdrop, it would be very difficult to achieve consensus of the entire Third 
World, among which the trade relationship across the sea is still relatively weak. 
 
In the meantime, the third explanation resorts to the self-image of the developing countries. 
Concurrently with their socio-economic growth, their mind-set is changing from viewing 
themselves as dependent states to that of independent states. They are now entering a rebel-
lious phase, where some argue that they are realizing that the West’s free market economy 
and rational actor assumption may not be the best platform to accommodate their needs, at 
least to the non-Western world. A distinctly China-focused scholar, David C. Kang had iden-
tified this point more than a decade ago by saying, “It is an open question whether Asia, with 
its very different political economy, history, culture, and demographics, will ever function 
like the European state system.” (Kang, 2003). He further developed his view in addressing 
this problem that “[power-] balancing has not characterized Asian history. In contrast, Asian 
international relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than 
those of the West” because of the presence of the Middle Kingdom or strong China and its 
tribute system, and that “As China continues its economic growth and military moderniza-
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tion, the key question will be whether the United States can or will allow China to resume its 
place at the top of the Asian regional hierarchy” (Kang, 2005). This may be more plausible 
compared to the second explanation, but still, no concrete evidence has been provided for ei-
ther explanation or the outcome remains to be seen. 
 
We now turn to the first explanation, a balance of power. Under the US hegemon, developing 
countries strive for survival through economic and financial dependency on the industrialized 
economies in the Western world, sometimes in exchange for undemocratic socio-economic 
systems, which favor those Western powers. After experiencing intermittent downward pres-
sure, such as the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, economic interdependency has been put 
forward to create interactions among the Third World countries (or South-South Cooperation) 
and its presence has been growing considerably in the last two decades – an emergence of, 
one might say, a new pillar in the international economy. It is not surprising that some coun-
tries, namely China, whose huge land and population and blooming industries had become 
less confined to the thinking of the old ‘Dependency Theory’ as they enter a self-sustaining 
development path and feel that with an increasing trade surplus, they deserve a greater voice 
in the international system. This sentiment was reflected in the speech given by a Chinese 
delegate from China Centre for Contemporary World Studies (CCCWS) at BRICS 6th Aca-
demic Forum, which said “With the development of emerging countries, the monopoly of 
developed countries on international power and the discourse on global governance has been 
broken. Developing countries, the emerging ones in particular, have moved gradually from 
the periphery of global governance to center stage” and concluded, “BRICS can become im-
portant bridges for North-South dialogue and South-South cooperation and make greater ef-
forts in narrowing the gap between the North and the South, and improving the representation 
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and voice of developing countries in international economic and financial affairs” (CCCWS, 
2014).  
 
Even so, with some flaws found in the current international monetary system, to be discussed 
later in this paper, it may not be fair to simply call as assertive or aggressive the move against 
the old regime, as the West may see it. The possibility cannot be excluded of “offensive-
realism” being in effect, but these emerging powers may also have some grounds to defend 
themselves from the reign of the West. This assumption may be difficult to prove, however 
some facts point out the existence of flaws in the current international monetary system. In 
the following paragraphs, this paper will present some data on how accumulated flaws have 
gradually created the conditions for developing countries to defect from the old regime to a 
new regime to better meet their needs. Among the questions to be asked, is there anything 
fundamentally wrong in the current system? Does it respond to the needs of developing coun-
tries’? This paper will examine the structure of the current systems for possible answers. 
 
Comparison with IMF, World Bank, ADB 
 
In the midst of World War Two, the allies had already begun to strategize about an interna-
tional financial framework to provide support to postwar expansion of international trade and 
investment (Weaver, 2011). The United States government not only wanted to prevent the 
repeat of economic chaos of the 1929 financial crash or ‘The Great Depression’, it also want-
ed to ensure its global leadership role in the post war era. John Maynard Keynes became the 
principal architect of the new international financial framework at the Bretton Woods Con-
ference in 1944 (Weaver, 2011). Representatives from 43 nations met at Bretton Woods, 
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New Hampshire to set up a system of rules, institutions and procedures to regulate interna-
tional monetary systems. (Toussaint, 2008). 
 
The well-intentioned Bretton Woods organizations were originally to prevent address the 
causes and prevent another Great Depression or World Wars. To support post-war recovery, a 
new gold standard was invented at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. Under the new sys-
tem, only the US dollar was convertible to gold, and other currencies were pegged to the dol-
lar. The IMF was established to help maintain exchange rate stability and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to finance long-term reconstruction pro-
jects. However, against the backdrop of the Cold War, the massive expenditures for the Vi-
etnam War depleted the US balance of payments and led to the suspension of dollar converti-
bility into gold in 1971. Other major economies followed suit, shifting to the floating ex-
change rate system and thus, abandoning the Bretton Woods in 1973. Under this ‘new’ sys-
tem, the only way to defend currency was by interventions by the central banks (open-market 
operations). The IMF also changed its scope to oversee borrower states’ economic policies to 
prevent financial crises. The conditionality imposed on borrowers in exchange for loans con-
stituted a standard reform package, sometime referred to as Washington Consensus. 
IMF 
Created at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the IMF was created as a response to the 
international financial “anarchy”, prevalent in the 1930s. It was officially established in 1945 
and began operations in 1947. The IMF headquarters is located in Washington D.C. and it 
began with 29 member states and the aim to reconstruct the international payment system 
(Peet, 2003: P57). IMF acts as an international lender. When its member countries are faced 
with balance of payment problems, they could apply for loans. The objectives of the organi-
zation as stated in Article I of the original Agreement are: (1) Promote international monetary 
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cooperation. (2) Expand and balance growth of international trade. (3) Promote exchange 
stability (4) Assist in the creation of a multilateral system of payment. (5) Ensure financial 
support is available to those member states in need (Peet, 2003: P58). 
 
Conditionality in Development Policy Lending   At its creation under the Bretton Woods 
agreement, member states only require “an effective program for establishing or keeping the 
stability of the currency of the member country at a realistic exchange rate” (Peet, 2003: 
P57). However, over the last 70 years, the conditions of the loans were used by the IMF to 
regulate the economic policies of the member countries. The issue of loan deliverance is not 
the problem. The problems concern the conditions which are attached to these loans that are 
creating problems for desperate governments (Peet, 2003: P57). Member states must follow a 
set of economic policies and prescribed financial measures based on IMF’s vision on how to 
promote economic stability and its ability to make interest and loan repayment. The policies 
imposed by IMF always require reduction in tariff barriers on imported goods, and usually 
this has led to unemployment. It has imposed higher interest rates to cool the economy and 
bring down inflation, which in turn, has created more unemployment. At the same time, it 
requires member states to reduce government services and remove state subsidies that keep 
food prices low. These IMF economic policies further create problems such as poverty and 
unemployment while reducing country’s ability to remedy the resulting social problem. Fur-
thermore, the IMF has imposed its own economic models on nations that might want to de-
velop under a different direction. Across the world, IMF loans became the focal point of ten-
sion between the societies and the global system, often with national government and the 
IMF at the center of the controversy. The general view is that IMF imposes conditions that 
favor repayment at the expense of the working people. 
 
  89"
In its report published in 2000, the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, 
chaired by Dr. Allan Meltzer, offered some insights on how international financial institu-
tions such as the IMF might better achieve its objectives. Among these insights is the stream-
lining of IMF conditions as well as strengthening overall focus on crisis prevention. It ad-
dressed concerns that the IMF conditions in the past were too wide-ranging and detailed, re-
ducing their effectiveness (Meltzer, 2002; Mikesell, 2001). The committee was established 
by the US Congress to recommend future US policy toward several multilateral institutions, 
however, the report’s proposals were not adopted. As summarized by Susanne Soederberg, 
the report shed light on the shortcomings of those institutions and also fundamentally chal-
lenged the legitimacy of Neoliberal restructuring of impoverished countries. She also noted 
that the IMF and World Bank are not neutral and independent public authorities, but rather a 
conduit to transmit the policy of states, particularly the US (Soederberg, 2004). 
World Bank 
Just like the IMF, the World Bank was also created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Confer-
ence. The World Bank’s headquarters is also located in Washington D. C. and the two organ-
izations have worked very closely with one other for the past 70 years. The World Bank is a 
member of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The World Bank consists of the 
following five specialized institutions:  (1) The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). (2) International Development Association (IDA). (3) International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). (4) Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). (5) In-
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (Peet, 2003: P112). 
 
The official goal of the World Bank is poverty reduction worldwide. With a mission state-
ment stating that “our dream is a world without poverty” (Peet, 2003: P111). In order to 
achieve the goal of world without poverty. The World Bank’s has its own theories of devel-
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opment; the World Bank argues that the developing countries must attract foreign investment 
and rely on borrowing from outside partners in order to lift itself out of poverty. (Toussaint, 
2008: P94). World Bank’s vision of development forced developing nations to dependent on 
foreign capital investment, often in the form of loans, which perceived to create a sense of 
self-sustained development. These loans are always provided by industrialized nations and 
the World Bank and are used as tools to maintain control over these indebted nations. 
 
One of the other theories of development used by the World Bank is the so called trickle-
down effect. The idea is that economic growth should be as strong as possible, that this 
growth will benefit the wealthy and that this wealth will trickle down to benefit the poor in 
the long run. However, most historians argue that this practice did not bring the much antici-
pated economic benefit for the poor. (Toussaint, 2008: P102) 
 
From the mid-1980s, the World Bank has faced criticism for providing money to projects that 
resulted in major environmental damage. For example, the Polonoroeste project in Brazil was 
intended to construct a 1500 KM highway and feeder roads into the Amazon region. It was 
meant to be a classic case of integrated rural development. However, the highway was com-
pleted in three years, but the social and governmental support has not been realized. Thou-
sands of people died of malaria because health services were not available. Both the United 
States and Brazil environmental groups, along with members of United States Congress criti-
cized the World Bank for providing funding for this project without having conducted any 
environmental assessments. During the IMF/World Bank annual meeting in September 1996, 
the World Bank was forced to create an Environment Department to consult with NGOs on 
environmental assessments for future funding projects (Peet, 2003: P135). 
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ADB 
The ADB was founded in 1966 and with the mandate to improve people’s lives in Asia and 
the Far East by alleviating poverty. The most oft-heard criticism of the ADB is that it has 
controlled by Japan throughout its history, and it works closely with Japan’s Ministry of Fi-
nance for the Japanese national interest. In fact, all of the ADB presidents have been Japa-
nese. Although the headquarters is located in Manila, Philippines, its board members and di-
rectors are largely non-Japanese, and 91% of its borrowing is in US dollars. A part of the rea-
son for the criticism is that, it allocates voting rights in proportion with members' capital sub-
scriptions, and Japan and the US are the largest shareholder with 15.7% and 15.6% of rights 
(as of 2013) respectively. Japan is undeniably an ally of the US, so we can assume that the 
bank is under the Western norm. Looking at the borrower’s side, 18% of outstanding borrow-
ing still goes to China, 18% to India, following Bangladesh (23%), Pakistan (21%) and Viet 
Nam (20%). Disbursement ratios in the PRC and India decreased as the ADB’s portfolios 
moved into less developed areas (ADB, 2013).  
 
It is reportedly said that the US had urged the developed countries not to join the AIIB, how-
ever since some European nations announced possible participation, the situation has 
changed. The Obama administration proposed that the bank work in a partnership with Wash-
ington-backed development institutions, such as the World Bank (WSJ, 2015), which in ef-
fect left out their ally, Japan, alone and thus was followed by a comment by the President of 
the ADB, stating “It is not an option [for the ADB] to confront [the AIIB]”. He didn’t forget 
to add that the bank may extend joint financing as long as the ADB’s investment criteria are 
met (SankeiBiz, 2015).  
 
On the other hand, obviously the Department of International Economic and Financial Coop-
eration under China’s Ministry of Finance is engaging itself to “sell” the AIIB, judging from 
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the number of photos recently uploaded onto its website wherein the Chinese (deputy-) fi-
nance minister and senior officials from government and financial institutions worldwide are 
shaking hands at the Boao Forum For Asia Annual Conference 2015. A Japanese news outlet 
reported that during this chain of meetings with officials, China criticized the ADB as bu-
reaucratic and tangled and that the AIIB must consider the demands of emerging states 
(Nikkei, 2015).  
 
Looking more broadly at the ASEAN and APEC region, there are many inter-governmental 
institutions that share similar goals. Not only the ADB but also International Development 
Association (IDA), an arm of the World Bank Group, and EU institutions play roles. One of 
the initiatives born from ‘Asia for Asia’ is called the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). During the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea faced a severe foreign 
debt crisis and were taught a lesson from the dark side of regional inter-connectedness that 
the East Asian economies were closely linked to each other and could not afford to ignore 
what was happening elsewhere within the region. Many in the region came to share an 
awareness that if they had had known what was happening and has more resources to resolve 
it, they would not have been hit so severely. To address this problem, the motion to set up an 
Asian Monetary Fund was made by Japan in 1997. However, it was strongly opposed by the 
IMF and the US and was subsequently abandoned as there was a morale hazard problem with 
regards to the IMF program. Yet, it adopted a form more acceptable to the IMF by giving it a 
central role, and after adjustments to supplement IMF resources, the CMI was agreed on at 
the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Chiang Mai. This was meant to be a safety net 
for financial crises and is comprised of swap agreements under which the members are able 
  93"
to draw up to 30% of their borrowing quota8 free from IMF conditionality and to full quota 
under a program tied to IMF program from foreign exchange reserve pools. However, when 
the financial crisis struck in 2008, some CMI members did not fully utilize the facility. This 
was largely because the CMI requires time-consuming procedures to actually draw funds as it 
was a bundle of bilateral agreements by which a country in need of foreign currency (or US 
dollars) asks its counterparts for those funds. Also, as mentioned earlier, this drawdown is 
mostly tied to an IMF program. Given the experience with the IMF after the Asian Financial 
crisis, it is no wonder that Korea avoided IMF-related financing and ended up borrowing 
more from the US Federal Reserve, which assured US$ 30 billion in contrast to US$ 3.7 bil-
lion it could draw from the CMI without an IMF program. Singapore followed suit, borrow-
ing from the US Federal Reserve and Indonesia borrowed from the World Bank. In the end, 
borrowing from the CMI is seen as “more symbolic than truly effective” while the need for a 
liquidity support mechanism for the region appeared to become less urgent as the region 
gradually recovered from the financial crisis (ADBI, 2010).  
 
Figure 103: Bilateral Swap Arrangement Network 
                                               
8 Its own contribution multiplied by an agreed multiplier 
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Source: Ministry of Finance of Japan 
 
In terms of bilateral aid, the US, Japan and Germany are among the biggest contributors. 
What is glaringly apparent is that China had been a beneficiary of that aid, receiving more 
than US$ 2 billion in 2010 through multilateral agencies (DAC, OECD, 2011) and continues 
to do so. At the same time, China has supplied aid to 121 countries of which around 50% is 
for Africa and 30% for Asia, and describes its foreign aid as "South-South co-operation to 
support and help developing countries” according to the white paper on China’s Foreign Aid 
2014 (SCIO, 2014). China, along with India had long been considered net recipients of aid, 
however, this is no longer the case – they have actually become net donors. As seen here, 
growing economic power and interactions among the global South have been acknowledged 
for quite some time and this was reiterated in December 2014 by Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon in his message at the United Nations Day of South-South Cooperation with a call to 
encourage and learn from emerging partners in the global South to promote prosperity for all 
(UN, 2014).  
  95"
 
What is also evident is that the national interest of China itself overlaps with possible geo-
graphic coverage of the BRICS bank and the AIIB. The chain of command and voting rights 
composition have yet to be seen, however China may not be able to avoid the allegations that 
Japan endures for the ADB unless voting rights are distributed on a one-country one-vote 
system, or that China’s capital contribution is equal to that of the other member countries or 
shareholders.  
 
Needs of Developing Countries 
 
The vulnerability of the economy and financial systems of developing nations and insuffi-
ciency of infrastructure investment in the region has been a widely-shared concern for some 
time. The World Bank issued a report which says structural reforms, including infrastructure 
investment, are crucial to enhance export competitiveness (World Bank, 2014). The President 
of the ADB also highlighted “the importance of infrastructure investment and the role of re-
gional cooperation in promoting sustainable and balanced growth in Asia” (ADB, 2014). He 
recently stated to the media that “The AIIB is necessitated by funding needs. The ADB’s 
money will not be rejected. The ADB’s credibility standing on our history will enable us to 
carry out our mission” (SankeiBiz, 2015). For those who share this concern, the establish-
ment of the new banks must have been most welcome.   
 
During the past decade, non-governmental aid flow grew in size. In the humanitarian and 
healthcare sector, NGOs have become one of major players in the filed along with inter-
governmental organizations such as WHO (IHME, 2013). However this brings about govern-
ance and aid arrangement issues. Aid packages often overlap, are fragmented and are not ful-
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ly hold accountable. OECD (2003) revealed that such agencies independently set their goals 
(or strings) and it undermines effectiveness and the recipients’ capability. As regards this is-
sue, the emergence of new banks may present the same complications, no matter how China 
stresses that they are made available for recipients’ benefit. 
 
 
What might a BRICS Bank look like? 
 
The location of the headquarters, the capitalization, governance design, the staffing of the top 
positions, and criteria with respect to alignment and potential conditions attached to the loans 
are some of the most contested issues of the BRICS Bank (Abdenur, 2014; Wulf and Debiel, 
2015).  
 
Location of the headquarters: China has successfully secured Shanghai as the headquarters of 
the BRICS Bank (Wulf and Debiel, 2015). This may also be in line with the aim of making 
Shanghai the financial and perhaps global center of China. Of note is that another Chinese 
headed organization, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (“SCO”) is also headquartered 
in Shanghai. Co-locating these two organizations in Shanghai may facilitate cooperation be-
tween the two, or perhaps the sharing of expertise and personnel. 
 
Capitalization. The current plan is to capitalize the BRICS Bank at $100 billion (Tierney, 
2014). Each of the five members will make an initial contribution of $10 billion, and this will 
be doubled in the future (Wulf and Debiel, 2015). However, according to Tierney (2014), the 
size of capitalization of the BRICS Bank is insufficient to make it a game changer. There are 
approximately 70 different multilateral entities that allocate development assistance (Tierney 
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et al., 2011); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which is part of 
the World Bank) alone is capitalized at over $300 billion (Tierney, 2014). And most of the 
development banks that aimed at changing the status quo are now collaborating as co-
financiers of the traditional Western donors (Shihata, 1978). Further, NDB comes with its 
twin – Contingency Reserve Arrangement (“CRA”) with a reserve currency pool worth over 
another $100 billion, aimed to provide financial support to countries under distress due to 
economic volatility. 
 
Governance design.  Wulf and Debiel (2015) find that the governance structure of the 
BRICS Bank would be largely similar to existing banks. The top positions will be filled and 
balanced among the five BRICS members, with Russia chairing the board of governors, Bra-
zil taking the chair of the board of directors and India filling the bank’s presidency for the 
first five years.  
 
New members are very likely to be allowed to enter the group, but the BRICS countries’ 
share is never to fall below 55 percent (Kelly, 2014). Indian and Russian officials have been 
pushing for equal voting rights, fair shareholding and embracing of non-BRICS states to join 
the institution (Wulf and Debiel, 2015; Abdenur, 2014).  
 
What is the criteria of projects for funding and potential conditions?  
 
The concrete details concerning the type of projects are to be funded are still under discussion 
(Wulf and Debeil, 2015). However, the BRICS bank’s purpose is to address the capital defi-
cits for long-term financing for infrastructure and industrial projects in developing countries 
(Abdenur, 2014). In particular, this is most likely to address the ‘infrastructure gap’, which 
The World Bank (2014) estimates to be $1 trillion USD in low- and middle-income countries. 
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Countries in the African continent are potentially major recipients given the emphasis on the 
continent at the Durban Summit (Abdenur, 2014) but the operations of the BRICS bank will 
not be exclusively focused on African development.  
 
The potential conditions of the loan are also under discussion. However, the BRICS emphasis 
on respecting national sovereignty suggests that the bank’s approaches will differ from those 
of the prevailing Bretton Woods Institutions, and will not impose political conditions on the 
loans it provides (Abdenur, 2014).  
 
Aims and Focus: BRICS leaders announced their plans for the establishment of a BRICS 
Bank back in 2012. The stated aims of the BRICS bank circulate around issues of governance 
and the contribution and distribution of capital. Their aims are as follows: 
 
•! ‘For mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in 
BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the exist-
ing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and devel-
opment’ (BRICS, 2012). And in a manner that will ‘supplement the existing efforts of mul-
tilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development’ (BRICS, 
2013). The wording in these declarations suggests that BRICS leaders recognize the long-
term benefits of inclusivity (Ghori, 2014). There is also the recognition of infrastructural 
developments as the key-determining factor in economic growth (Wilson et al., 2011). 
•! This new International Organization aims to facilitate South-South cooperation through 
enhancing trade flows among BRICS countries (and other emerging economies) and en-
couraging payment in BRICS’ currencies in order to mitigate the effects of currency vola-
tility (Abdenur, 2014). In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, this idea became 
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increasingly prominent as BRICS policymakers seek to minimize the risks associated with 
invoicing in major currencies like US dollar (Ghori, 2014). An earlier effort, for example, 
can be found in China, where significant progress has been made in invoicing bilateral 
trade in Renminbi and promoting the offshore bond market in Hong Kong since 2009 (Au-
boin, 2012).  
•! The BRICS Bank seeks to demonstrate the power of emerging economies and the ability of 
BRICS members to advance their agenda. A number of analysts (Ghori, 2014; Robles, 
2012; Swamy, 2014) see the BRICS leaders’ criticism on IMF reforms as a signal of their 
political ambition. However, Abdenur (2014) speculates that loans are likely to be offered 
at a market rate, which lowers the influence of political considerations.  
 
An excerpt from Desai and Vreeland (2011) helps illustrate the benefits of regional economic 
integration, “Financial crises over the last decade demonstrate that the unilateral defense of a 
national currency is a challenging task, but one that can be helped through the collective ef-
forts of countries banding together. Indeed, this was the rationale for the creation of the 
IMF.” If the term ‘economics’ is substituted for ‘security’, this may also be a new and partic-
ularly 21st century form of ‘bandwagoning.” 
 
For developing countries, the problem of ‘‘original sin,’’ as Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(2005) call it, is that firms and governments find it impossible to borrow long term in their 
own currencies and are therefore forced to do one of two things: borrow exclusively short-
term, or accumulate indebtedness in foreign currency. Both of these factors increased volatili-
ty, which in the presence of a large stock of unhedged, foreign-currency denominated debt, 
often leads to dramatic declines in the private sector’s credit worthiness. According to this 
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definition, most countries outside the major currency blocs and financial centers of Europe or 
the United States are tainted by original sin. 
 
In the medium-term, deepening regional monetary cooperation via liquidity funds, regional 
exchange-rate mechanisms or currency unions can cushion countries from the impact of eco-
nomic shocks, such as the one the world has recently experienced. In the long run, it is also 
possible for regional monetary regimes to minimize a country’s exposure to currency and ma-
turity mismatches and the share of foreign-currency denominated debt.  
 
This depends on the extent to which regionally integrated financial markets with stabilized 
intra-regional exchange rates can be developed. In addition to a willingness to cooperate, a 
clear regional ‘‘hierarchy’’ in terms of foreign-currency liabilities must be in place. Regional 
monetary regimes will not be possible if all regional nations are equally indebted in foreign 
currency. One or more economies must have limited foreign-currency debt—a low level of 
‘‘original sin’’—to play a strong lender-of-last-resort function, and to have the capacity to 
intervene in favor of weaker countries during extra-regional shocks. Regional ‘‘original-sin’’ 
hierarchies, combined with the presence of a regional economic hegemon, are signs of a re-
gion well suited to a regionally based monetary regime. 
 
A two-tiered system for the global financial architecture—an IMF alongside a single or set of 
monetary fund(s) for developing countries—has been proposed elsewhere  (Johnson 2009; 
Subramanian 2010) 
 
In principle, a number of regional funds could play a first-stop role. These could be institu-
tions where nations in distress could turn before borrowing from the IMF. The current reality 
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is that for middle-income countries in Asia and South America, unlike any potential EMF, 
regional entities would likely compete with the IMF, not act in a supplementary, ‘‘triaging’’ 
manner. 
 
Japan first proposed an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in 1997, following the East Asian fi-
nancial crisis, originally aiming to create a pool of funds to be quickly disbursed as a means 
of emergency balance of payments support for the crisis-hit economies. As Lipscy (2003) 
explains, the Japanese finance ministry made three observations: (I) the US-IMF bailout of 
Mexico in 1995 was vital for the economic health of North America, (ii) the United States did 
not have the same incentive to bail out the East Asian countries to which the Japanese econ-
omy was intimately tied, (iii) while the United States could push the IMF to pursue US policy 
preferences, Asian governments lacked political influence. 
What are the overlapping niches of the IMF, World Bank and ADB?   
 
Despite much excitement on the challenges that a BRICS bank might bring to the IMF, 
World Bank and ADB (Harmer and Buse, 2014), it remains impossible to determine whether 
the BRICS have the ambition and ability to challenge the Bretton Woods Institutions (Watson 
et al., 2013).  The BRICS bank’s focus on infrastructural development overlaps with the aims 
of the World Bank and the ADB (Watson et al., 2013). However, Brazil, Russia and South 
Africa are not members of the ADB. So the BRICS bank is likely to serve a different niche of 
countries than the ADB. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), aims to provide a se-
curity net to financial volatilities, overlaps with the IMF (Watson et al., 2013).  
The various statements made by BRICS leaders thus far suggest a more inclusive nature of 
the BRICS bank. The bank is likely to address some of the continued critiques of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions such as the lack of participation from low-income countries, their domi-
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nance of the development discourse and a negative social outcome (Watson et al., 2013; 
Stiglitz, 2002). The BRICS bank can be seen as an extension from the previous The Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multi-lateralization (CMIM), expanding the number of countries involved 
(Watson et al. 2003). In response to the talks of establishing the AIIB and NDB, the Asian 
Development Bank seeks to raise the amount it can lend annually to US$18 billion for infra-
structure and other projects (Pilling, 2015) 
 
In fiscal year 2012, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Interna-
tional Development Association (both under The World Bank) lent a total of US $35 billion 
dollars to developing countries (The World Bank, 2015). This represents a substantial rever-
sal back to the original aim of infrastructural development, from poverty reduction and en-
hancing social development such as healthcare and education.  A BRICS bank will need to 
clearly establish sets of policies and procedures in order to ensure that their lending policy 
does not resort to the assumption of trickle-down economics in justifying funding of infra-
structural developments.  
 
What are potential challenges, including transparency of both lender and of recipients 
in utilizing the funding for the stated projects: how to deal with corruption issues? 
 
Cox argues that institutions ‘can become either a battleground of opposing tendencies, or 
stimulate the creation of rival institutions reflecting different tendencies’ (1981, p. 136). 
Grouping the BRICS countries based on Jim O’Neill’s catchphrase back in 2001 has led to an 
illusion that the countries share the same values and objectives in the international communi-
ty. Aside from their impressive economic growth and intention to make their voices heard in 
international economic institutions, there are significant differences between BRICS mem-
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bers. Some critics have quickly dismissed the BRICS countries as an artificial bloc founded 
on a Goldman Sachs catchphrase (Robles, 2014).  
 
Intra-regional disputes and unwillingness to cede economic sovereignty to an overarching 
institution have always plagued regionalization efforts and the BRICS bank is no exception. 
In the case of China and India, both see the other as a key competitor in the region, with oc-
casional open-conflicts breaking out along the Sino-Indian border.  
 
Armijo and Roberts (2013) argue that it would be difficult for China to push the BRICS bank 
to make RMB-denominated loans (instead of US dollars). This would require the recipients 
to spend this currency on Chinese goods and/or earn RMB to repay the loan. This may lead 
China to come under the same accusation of economic imperialism as has the U.S. among the 
developing countries and undermine its claim as a ‘partner’ to the South.  
 
Other problems include official data being incomplete, non-comparable and highly aggregat-
ed (Strange et al. 2013). As an attempt to differentiate themselves from the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, the BRICS bank is unlikely to press the recipient countries to adopt ‘good gov-
ernance’. This is evidenced by the vague talks over BRICS Anti-Corruption Cooperation, but 
this could improve as further discussions unfold. China went as far as claiming that the prin-
ciple of transparency should apply to north–south cooperation, but it should not be seen as a 
standard for South–South cooperation” (Tran 2011 cited in Tierney, 2014). However, how 
will the BRICS Bank ensure that funds are actually used for the stated purpose and not di-
verted for personal or political gain? 
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Griffith-Jones (2014) suggests that a complimentary relationship between the BRICS bank 
and the IMF can be built. While the IMF will continue to provide short-term balance of pay-
ments financing, the BRICS bank will be similar to the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 
terms of funding long-term investments in infrastructure. In fact, the BRICS bank could learn 
from the EIB, in terms of the latter’s experiences and expertise in the field.  
 
Based on their strict understanding of national sovereignty, the BRICS and China in particu-
lar, tend not to include political conditionality in their lending procedure (Mwase/Yang 2012: 
5). It is therefore unlikely that the NDB will condition lending to indicators such as good 
governance, human rights, corruption, or environmental and social impact of the financed 
projects (Dossani 2014; Green 2014: 3; Maihold 2014: 3). As value-based conditions for 
credits are expected to be minor or absent, the likelihood that the NDB will adapt a paradigm 
of institutional development is also very low. The current approach of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) includes tools of direct financial support for 
institutional reforms (including an a priori set legal framework of implementation), institu-
tional based conditionality and technical assistance to improve institutions (Prado/Salles 
2014: 167f). On the other hand, experiences from Brazilian and Chinese development coop-
eration show that they either work within existing institutional contexts (Brazilian model) or 
even try to circumvent them if they represent obstacles for the financed output (Chinese 
model) (Prado/Salles 2014: 169f, 178f ). Therefore, a pro-active institutional development 
paradigm is rather unlikely to be established within the NDB. 
 
Notwithstanding, even if the NDB is ideologically willing to take those higher risks and re-
duce conditionality, and even though this risk would be shared in a multilateral bank (in con-
trast to a national development bank), it would still have to follow international bank stand-
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ards of lending during its first years. These include ‘prudential conditionality’, which ensures 
that loans are used purposely and repaid (Green 2014: 2). Consequently, it is likely that the 
bank will require a similar bureaucratic effort from borrowing countries, as does the World 
Bank System (Weeks 2014). If the NDB does not follow such standards, it will risk its own 
rating on the international financial market and by that the necessary ability to raise its capital 
stock (Maihold 2014: 2). On this point, the current NDB agreement only states vaguely, that 
‘[the operations of the Bank] shall be conducted in accordance with sound banking prin-
ciples’ (NDB Agreement 2014: Art. 3). 
 
One of the potential solutions to the alleged problems of corruption is the Angola model, giv-
en the leading role of the Chinese government on the BRICS bank. The Angola model entails 
providing infrastructure development in exchange for raw natural resources. 
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Multilateral Institution Power Play 
 
China vs. US, China's Rise vs. US Decline in influence.   
 
The notion of a ‘China threat’ within social science has emerged as a recent phenomenon 
(Kristof, 1993). Put together, this theory suggests that the rise of China would challenge the 
hegemony of the U.S., as its military and economic capacities grow (Storey and Yee, 2002). 
Theoretically, a threat is only meaningful within the fields of military and security, but the 
assumption of a ‘China threat’ reinforces the reluctance for both China and the U.S. to under-
stand each other (Roy, 1996). In time, the ‘China threat’ encapsulates the ideological and 
economic differences between China and the U.S.  
The internationals relations theory of Realism posits the nation-state as being the primary ac-
tor within an international climate of anarchy (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008), and is heavily in-
fluenced by themes of ‘struggle for power’ (Morgenthau, 1973) and ‘self-help’ (Waltz, 
1979). This theory has drawn social scientists — especially U.S. scholars — towards a fu-
ture-oriented assessment of potential risks on the domestic and international scale (Bloom-
field, 1978; Clarke, 1986; Heng, 2002). 
A.F.K. Organski’s (1968) power transition theory is often used to support arguments that a 
great power like China would expand its political and military capacities once its economy is 
fully developed (Kristof, 1993; Nye, 1997; Casetti, 2000). One of the key tenets of Organ-
ski’s (1968) theory is that the different stages of industrialization are a more determinant fac-
tor in generating power redistribution in the international system than political and military 
capacities. 
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From a Chinese perspective, Yee and Feng (2002) cited Shen (unknown), suggested that the 
U.S. ‘is looking far and wide for an enemy on purpose for its old enemy has disappeared with 
the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It seems that these 
people cannot go without an enemy.’ 
 
There are numerous examples of China’s Rise and America’s decline. Broomfield (2003) 
states that with the largest population in the world, China has a massive domestic market. In 
turn, this has fueled inward foreign direct investments (FDI) towards China and how China is 
being perceived in the West has become increasingly important (Downs and Saunders, 1998). 
While Dicken (2011) notes that China and Hong Kong alone accounted for 30% of the in-
ward FDI in developing countries, Ravenhill (2006) notes that the losses of FDI in South East 
Asian countries are likely to be offset by an increase in export towards a more prosperous 
China.  
 
Indeed, the growing economic capacities in China have long been transformed into strategic 
concerns in the U.S. (Roy, 1994).  Regarding the U.S.’s increasing trade deficit with China, a 
report prepared by the Center for Security Policy (1997; 1) suggests that ‘Communist China 
is utilizing much of the huge trade surplus that it enjoys thanks to this privileged trading sta-
tus [Most Favored Nation] to mount a strategic threat to the United States and its vital inter-
ests in Asia, the Middle East and beyond’. Broomfield (2003; 272) finds that ‘China threat’ 
advocates often stress that the trade surpluses and an undervalued Renminbi have been em-
ployed as a strategy to harm the U.S. and provide ‘a great source of contention in future Sino-
American relations’. 
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The US has repeatedly appealed to its allies not to join the AIIB based on weak arguments — 
that they would maintain a larger influence from outside the AIIB. A number of the U.S’ al-
lies have already agreed to join the AIIB. That such longstanding European allies have sought 
to join the AIIB in spite of U.S. exhortations to refrain from doing so, underscores the weak-
ening position of what seems to be a declining superpower intent on maintaining its position, 
even in the face of declining resources to do so. One of the strategies, which China has used 
to promote itself as a partner, is that it gave up the rights of veto in AIIB. 
 
BRICs Bank vs. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Legitimizing China’s FDI. 
 
There are some similarities between the NDB and AIIB. China plays a major role in the es-
tablishment of both banks, which clearly demonstrates and enhances its ability in projecting 
soft power (Tortajada and Biswas, 2014). In establishing the AIIB, China has funded half of 
its initial capital, which is about US$50 billion. Both banks are seen as a challenge or a 
reformation effort directed at the Bretton Woods Institutions. The banks emphasize infra-
structural developments as the key driver of economic growth. Investing in the banks would 
allow China to diversify its foreign reserves of US$3.9 trillion, rather than putting the bulk of 
it into purchasing US sovereignty bonds —where its real value is shrinking. It also contrib-
utes towards internationalizing the RMB.  
 
If the banks were to adopt the much cited Angola Model, this would help Chinese firms to 
secure overseas contracts. The Chinese government has already indicated that it wishes the 
NDB to be modeled after the Chinese Development Bank, heightening such possibility 
(Wihtol, 2014). 
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However, the AIIB’s focus on Asia would better serve to advance China’s political agenda of 
‘One Road, One Belt’, which at the moment seems to have a far-reaching effect on power 
reconfiguration and development of multilateralism (Wang, 2015). 
 
The geopolitical significance of these developments cannot be ignored, particularly the fund-
ing of projects that are similar to the Sino-Burma pipelines. This refers to the gas and oil 
pipelines that linked the Yunnan province of China to Burma’s deep-water port of Ky-
aukphyu in the Bay of Bengal. The significance of these projects lies in enabling China to 
reduce its dependency on the Straits of Malacca (Kong, 2010) and mitigate the potential 
threat of the First and Second Island Chain on China (Yoshihara, 2012). 
 
The initiative of ‘One Road’ refers to the reinvigoration of the Silk Road through major infra-
structural investments in Central Asia — an area that has been referred as a ‘great natural for-
tress’ that deters the influences of major sea powers (see Mackinder, 1943). Pipelines and 
major infrastructural developments in the area would facilitate trade between China, Central 
Asia, and Europe, without interference by the U.S. government.  
 
Competition for influence and control of resource rich underdeveloped countries and their 
votes in other international organizations may constitute the new ‘dollar diplomacy’. To truly 
understand this issue requires unpacking the problems that China currently faces with its re-
source-backed programs, for example, the use of Chinese companies and labor and the 
somewhat limited participation from African countries. Materials used in infrastructural de-
velopments often need to be imported, because borrowing countries lack the capacity to 
manufacture or process these items (Corkin, 2011). 
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Challenges include forms of payment. An example includes the recent drop in oil prices, 
which has seriously undermined countries’ capacity, like Venezuela, to repay their debts in 
the form of resources. The BRICS bank and AIIB contribute towards addressing this issue by 
mitigating the perception that China is trying to take control of resource rich, underdeveloped 
countries. The banks also help spread the risks among different countries. 
 
The New Scramble for Africa.  
 
China has been active on the African continent for some time and has played a major role in 
industrializing many African nations, building infrastructure, and investing in new projects. 
The U.S. has also made the decision to direct resources to the African continent. How will 
this new competition between the status-quo institutions and the new China-led institutions 
play out in a place where both are considered outsiders? 
 
Some of the limitations of utilizing the BRICS bank or AIIB 
 
BRICS has a small initial capital when compared to the funding demands of developing 
countries for infrastructural development. As a demonstration of soft power, both the BRICS 
bank and the AIIB — dominated by China —would want to acquire and sustain a AAA credit 
rating and raise capital without invoking its own economic capacity. Doing so is likely to un-
dermine claims of creating a multipolar world order. However, doing so puts the BRICS 
countries in a dilemma; to acquire an AAA credit rating requires a significant degree of con-
formity regarding current financial structure, weakening BRICS bank claim as a new alterna-
tive. 
 
  111"
China’s Role in BRICS 
 
“Hide one’s talents, bide one’s time” is Deng Xiaoping’s quote for Chinese leaders on the 
world stage. (Shield 2014 P147) During Deng’s era, China had just begun its own domestic 
economic development and desperately required foreign assistance. However, by the turn of 
the new millennium, China had grown prosperous and was ready to assert its influence on the 
global stage. Many viewed former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the January 2009 
World Economic Forum as a direct challenge to the global economic governance system. 
Premier Wen stated that the global financial crisis that began in 2008 had “fully exposed the 
deficiencies in the existing international financial system and its governance structure” and 
called for “the establishment of a new world economic order that is just, equitable, sound and 
stable.” (Shield 2014 P147)  
 
 China has begun to play an increasingly active role in global affairs, as evidenced in the es-
tablishment of new international organizations, such as BRICS bank and the Shanghai Coop-
erative Organization. For China, the BRICS Bank provides an opportunity to legitimize Chi-
na’s multilateralism strategy, create a position image that China seeks to be a responsible 
global actor trying to reshape established global institution rather than upending them. The 
bank provide China the means to influence the practice of the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and at the same time learn about the practices and prin-
ciples used by these organization in the area of South-South cooperation. (Abdenur 2014 
P86) 
 
From a geopolitical point of view, the BRICS Bank can help China counter Western-led 
global financial systems without direct confrontation. This allows China to strengthen its dual 
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identity as a developing nation dedicated to South-South cooperation, and as an emerging 
nation striving for global governance reform. This also deepens China’s intra-BRICS rela-
tions and allows China to increase trade and investment ties to other regional powers. This, in 
turn, provides China with greater influence to reshape international development at the global 
level. China’s own desire to strengthen its relations with African nations helps to explain the 
efforts to include South Africa into The BRICS bank while also reflecting China’s strong in-
terest in the African continent and view of South Africa as a gateway to rest of the continent. 
(Abdenur 2014 p91) 
 
The 2012 work report of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress reflected the im-
portance of the BRICS Bank within China’s multilateral strategy. The report only mentioned 
the UN, G20, SCO and BRICS among China’s international organization priorities and pro-
vided guidelines for China’s grand strategy in the coming years. (Abdenur 2014 p91) 
 
China is the largest BRICS economy and represents 70% of the BRICS’ GDP. For example, 
bilateral trade between China and other Asian countries dwarfs its trade with the other 
BRICS nations. (Farnswroth 2014 para6) Even though China appears to be the de facto leader 
of BRICS, so far China has downplayed its overwhelming economic might relative to that of 
other BRICS members. BRICS members do not want to see Chinese dominance over the per-
ceived Western dominance of the international system either. These nations want a larger 
voice but do not want either the current or a new system significantly influenced by China. 
(Farnsworth 2014 para7) Some of the BRICS countries are traditional enemies; China’s own 
economic strength and perceived assertiveness could potentially create new problems within 
the BRICS itself. 
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Future Expectations/Rhetoric of a BRICS Bank 
 
The BRICS bank and AIIB are likely conceived as the continuation of the discourse of the 
‘Peaceful Rise of China’ under Hu Jintao. China is likely to continue to present itself as a 
constructive, peaceful and friendly partner and neighbor.  The BRICS bank can provide the 
developing countries with an alternative source of finance. It also allows the BRICS countries 
to free themselves from the restrictions and conditions imposed by the Bretton Woods Institu-
tions. Given its scope, the AIIB is likely to gain more attention in 2015.  
 
The BRICS bank is likely to be limited by a number of factors. The BRICS leaders have dif-
ferent interests and ambitions, and these disputes are likely to impact the provision of fund-
ing. China, in particular, would seek to expand its influence given that its foreign reserves are 
unmatched by the other members. The repetition of the Angola Model may not be successful 
if commodity/raw material prices continue to be volatile. This may lead to high levels of de-
faults among developing countries that rely on resource-backed loans.  
 
Alternatives 
 
Evolution of IMF, World Bank, ADB or Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The BRICS 
bank promises to be more inclusive in nature than the Bretton Woods Institutions and the 
ADB led by the US government and its ally, Japan. It is pioneering a model to facilitate 
South-South cooperation among different regions. That China is giving up its veto rights in 
the AIIB is a welcoming indicator that it seeks to gain greater cooperation in the short term. 
However, both the AIIB and BRICS bank claim their creation to be major mile-
stones/cornerstones of China’s soft power.  
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Expectations of BRICS Bank focus 
 
The BRICS bank countries are likely to focus on infrastructure development projects, having 
experienced high-levels of economic growth themselves over the last several decades. How-
ever, it is unclear how the BRICS bank would establish its criteria for funding development 
projects. But it is likely to be free of the political conditions that constitute Western expecta-
tions of good governance. In its initial stages, these projects will likely be in areas with fewer 
conflicts of interests among BRICS countries. For example, development projects are unlike-
ly to be funded in Arunachal Pradesh — an area which China and India are having border 
disputes.  
 
In positioning the BRICS Bank in a multipolar world, will the BRICS Bank create posi-
tive competition which could re-invigorate the Bretton Woods institutions?  The BRICS 
Bank is likely to conform to the international financial norms in the initial stages of its estab-
lishment. Minimal or no political conditions would be attached to the loans. Drawing on the 
discourse of South-South cooperation, the BRICS Bank is to position itself as ‘partners’ in-
stead of ‘donors’ to the borrowing states, emphasizing knowledge transfer, environmental 
protection, cooperation with locals. The BRICS Bank seeks to build on the experiences of the 
BRICS’ current foreign aid programs, such as the Angola Model.  A reform in the Bretton 
Woods Institutions is unlikely due to the internal politics in the U.S. and opposition by small-
er European states. The stance which the U.S. government has taken on the AIIB suggests 
that the U.S. is unwilling to embrace new institutions, perceiving them as challenging to the 
status quo and therefore against U.S. interests. 
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